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POLICE-OBTAINED EVIDENCE AND THE
CONSTITUTION: DISTINGUISHING
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OBTAINED
EVIDENCE FROM UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
USED EVIDENCEt
Arnold H. Loewy*

The exclusion of police-obtained evidence at a criminal trial can be
justified by one of two theories. Under one theory, evidence is excluded because the police have unconstitutionally obtained the evidence and exclusion is thought desirable to deter such police behavior
in the future by precluding a substantial benefit from such misconduct.
Under the other theory, the evidence is excluded because the Constitution guarantees the defendant a procedural right to exclude the evidence.1 The former theory focuses on the constitutional impropriety
of obtaining the evidence, while the latter theory's focus is on the constitutional impropriety of using that evidence at trial. Obviously, one's
choice of theory will affect the occasions upon which evidence is excluded. It will also determine whether the officer who obtained the
evidence is vulnerable to a lawsuit by the person from whom it was
obtained.
The thesis of this article is that neither rationale is universally appropriate because sometimes the Court is faced with unconstitutionally obtained evidence and other times it is faced with evidence whose
use is forbidden by the Constitution. I will categorize various types of
police-obtained evidence and explore the ramifications of treating a
particular piece of evidence one way or the other.
The article will consider four different types of police-obtained evidence: evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search and
t© 1989 Arnold H. Loewy.
• Professor, University of North Carolina School of Law. J.D. 1963, Boston University;
L.L.M. 1964, Harvard. - Ed. The author would like to thank Alicia Davenport and David
Gilpin for their dedicated research assistance in the preparation of this article, Professors Robert
Mosteller of Duke University and Yale Kamisar of Michigan for their comments on an earlier
draft, several professors from the University of North Carolina Law School faculty for their
comments during a presentation of this paper, and the University of North Carolina Law Center
for its financial support.
1. A third theory sometimes advanced is that of judicial integrity. In recent years, however,
a majority of the Court has not taken this theory seriously. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 921 n.22 (1984).
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seizure, 2 evidence obtained from a Miranda 3 violation, confessions
and lineup identifications obtained in violation of the sixth amendment
right to counsel,4 and coerced confessions. My conclusions are that
evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search and seizure is excluded because of the police misconduct by which it was obtained. On
the other hand, evidence obtained from a Miranda violation is (or
ought to be) excluded because use of that evidence compromises the
defendant's procedural right not to be compelled to be a witness
against himself. 5 Confessions and lineup identifications obtained after
the right to counsel has attached also are excluded for procedural reasons. Finally, all coerced confessions are excluded because procedurally their introduction violates the fifth amendment. Some coerced
confessions are also excluded because of police misconduct in obtaining them. Ultimately, this article demonstrates that whether evidence is unconstitutionally obtained or unconstitutionally used ought
to make a difference, and that the Court's frequent failure to think in
these terms has caused it to overlook the differences.

I.

UNCONSTITUTIONAL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

The Supreme Court's fourth amendment exclusionary rule jurisprudence is fairly simple. 6 The Court views the fourth amendment as
a protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. It perceives
the exclusionary rule to be a remedial device designed to implement
that protection by deterring or reducing the incentive to conduct an
2. The fourth amendment to the U. S. Constitution reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV.
3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ..• to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5. "No person ..• shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ..•." U.S. CoNsr. amend. V.
6. This is not true of its substantive fourth amendment jurisprudence, which is anything but
simple. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 483 (1971) ("Of course, it would be
nonsense to pretend that our decision today reduces Fourth Amendment law to complete order
and harmony. The decisions of the Court over the years point in differing directions and differ in
emphasis. No trick of logic will make them all perfectly consistent."); Chime! v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 755-60 (1968) (tracing the "hardly .•. unimpeachable line of authority" for search and
seizure cases); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(stating "[t]he course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures ..• has not - to put it
mildly - run smooth"). See generally LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law
••. Has Not • •. Run Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255; Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974).
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unlawful search or seizure. 7 Although powerful arguments have been
made against this approach, 8 it is fundamentally sound for the reasons
that follow.9
First and foremost, fourth amendment rights are substantive as opposed to procedural rights. Like freedom of speech, 10 the right to bear
arms, 11 and especially the immunity from having soldiers quartered in
one's home, 12 freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is a
substantive protection available to all inhabitants of the United States,
whether or not charged with crime. The right thus differs from protections under most of the fifth amendment and all of the sixth amendment, which refer to persons charged with crime or "the accused." 13
Fear of unreasonable searches and seizures rather than concern
about criminal trials produced the fourth amendment. The most famous English 14 and colonial15 search and seizure cases involved innocent citizens. It was their plight that inspired people like James Otis
to demand protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. 16
7. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976); Uiµted States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
347-48 (1974); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965).
8. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 355·67 (Brennan, J.; dissenting); Kamisar, Does
(Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather Than an ''Empirical
Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 565 (1983); Schrock & Welsh, Up from Calandra: The
Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REv. 251 (1974).
9. At least, it is sound in principle. For the reasons that follow, it is not always sound in
application. See infra text accompanying notes 26-43.
10. U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
12. U.S. CoNST. amend. III.
13. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution reads:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ..• nor shall any person be subject/or the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any crfminal case
to be a witness against himself . . . .
.
U.S. CoNST. amend. V (emphasis added). The sixth amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial ...
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CoNST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
14. See Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763); Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils.
275, 19 Howell's State Trials 1030, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
15. See Paxton's Case, Mass. Bay Rep. (Quincy) 51 (1761). See generally R. RUTLAND, THE
BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791 (1955). Rutland discusses a Boston town meeting at
which "A List of Infringements and Violations of Rights" was drawn up which "alluded to a
number of personal rights which had allegedly been violated by agents of the crown. The list
included complaints against the writs of assistance which had been employed by royal officers in
their searches for contraband. The Bostonians complained that 'our houses and even our bed
chambers are exposed to be ransacked, our boxes, chests, and trunks broke open, ravaged and
plundered by wretches, whom no prudent man would venture to employ even as menial servants.' " Id. at 25.
16. See John Adams' "abstract" of James Otis' argument against the Writ of Assistance in
Paxton's Case, Mass. Bay Rep. (Quincy) 51 (1761): "I will to my dying day oppose, with all the
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Indeed, because searches and seizures are permitted when an independent magistrate has determined that there is probable cause to
find particular evidence of guilt at the place to be searched, 17 I have
argued that the purpose of the fourth amendment is to protect the
innocent and that the guilty are merely necessary incidental beneficiaries of the innocent person's right not to be searched. 18 However
that issue might ultimately be resolved, 19 the fourth amendment, in
language and origin, is clearly substantive in that it is concerned with
obtaining rather than using evidence. Therefore, the Court was correct in holding the exclusionary rule to be simply a remedial device
designed to make the substantive right more meaningful2° rather than
an independent procedural right.2 1
Some critics have contended that the review of the fourth amendment renders its rights second class. 22 The fallacy of this critique is
that it attempts to compare substantive rights with procedural rights.
Procedural rights are supposed to exclude evidence. Substantive
rights need not. Consequently, fourth amendment rights should be
deemed different from, but not less important than, the procedural
rights protected by the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments. By
way of comparison, first and third amendment rights are substantive,
powers and faculties God has given me, all such instruments of slavery on the one hand, and
villainy on the other, as this writ of assistance is." M. SMITH, THE WRITS OF AssISTANCE CASE
552 (1978) (from Adams' "Abstract" in the Massachusetts Spy of April 29, 1773). Otis pronounced the writs of assistance "the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of
English liberty, and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was found in an English law
book .•.•" Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886) (quoting T. COOLEY, CONSTITU·
TIONAL LIMITATIONS 368 (5th ed. 1883)). See also R. RUTLAND, supra note 15. "Blackstone's
comment that a general warrant 'to apprehend all persons suspected, without naming or particularly describing any person in special, is illegal and void for its uncertainty' was regarded by
Americans as a correct view of the matter." Id. at 11 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA·
RIES *291).
17. Cf. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300-10 (1967) (evidence otherwise properly obtained is not to be excluded because it is "mere evidence" to which the government cannot assert
a superior proprietary interest).
18. See Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device/or Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L.
REV. 1229 (1983).
19. For a recent criticism, see Maclin, Constructing Fourth Amendment Principles from the
Government Perspective: Whose Amendment Is It, Anyway?, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 669, 705-18
(1988).
20. See supra note 7.
21. The argument that the fourth and fifth amendments "run almost into each other," Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), although occasionally invoked, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 646 (1961); 367 U.S. at 662 (Black, J., concurring), has been discredited, see Andresen
v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 471-77 (1976). Indeed, it is flatly inconsistent with the Court's will·
ingness to allow the introduction of evidence from reasonable searches, which is likely· to be at
least as incriminating as evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures.
22. See Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45
ILL. L. REV. 1, 29 (1950); Kamisar. supra note 8, at 632-33, 640; see also infra text accompanying notes 137-39.
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but nobody would deem them second class. 23
On the other hand, searches and seizures are usually employed to
obtain evidence of crime. Consequently, it makes good sense from a
utilitarian perspective to engraft an exclusionary rule onto the fourth
amendment. Although the jury is still out on how well the exclusionary rule works as a deterrent, 24 it is counter-:intuitive to deny the disincentive character of the rule. Surely, a police officer who knows that
unconstitutionally obtained evidence will be admissible would have an
incentive that is absent in an officer who knows that such evidence is
inadmissible.
Given that the fourth amendment wrong is obtaining evidence, the
Court must consider the circumstances under which the exclusionary
rule should be applied. The Court's response has been to balance the
costs of the exclusionary rule against its benefits. 25 While the cost/
benefit approach is sound, the balance actually struck by the Court is
another matter. By regularly decrying the high cost of the exclusionary rule, the Court has failed to apply it to situations in which it could
have discouraged unconstitutional conduct.
For example, in United States v. Payner, 26 the Court refused to
suppress evidence illegally seized from a banker's briefcase which the
government used against Payner. The evidence was stolen from
banker Wolstencroft's briefcase while his attention was diverted by a
woman, hired by the government for that purpose. Because the government sought evidence against Wolstencroft's clients and not Wolstencroft himself, it felt free to violate Wolstencroft's fourth
amendment rights, secure in the knowledge that any evidence obtained
23. Arguably, the second amendment, which is also substantive, is somewhat second class.
See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (adopting a collective rights approach to
the amendment, whereby it protects the interests of the state and not individual citizens). The
treatment of this amendment, however, does not suggest that all substantive amendments are
second class.
24. There is little empirical evidence available on the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule as
a deterrent, and what little there is is not conclusive. See Canon, The Exclusionary Rule: Have
Critics Proven That It Doesn't Deter Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 398 (1979) (arguing that studies so
far have been inconclusive); Schlesinger, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Proponents Proven That It
Is a Deterrent to Police?, 62 JUDICATURE 404 (1979) (arguing that most studies question the
rule's effectiveness and that proponents of the rule have not met their burden of proving that it is
an effective deterrent). See generally Exclusionary Rule in Criminal Trials: Oversight Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983) (examining the operation of the exclusionary rule as an enforcement mechanism for
the fourth amendment with regard to its costs to society and its effectiveness as a deterrent, and
exploring alternate methods of enforcing fourth amendment rights). But cf Oaks, Studying the
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665, 756 (1970) (the exclusionary
rule is not an effective deterrent and should be replaced with a tort remedy).
25. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128
(1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
26. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
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would be admissible aga~st Wolstencroft's clients. Although the
Court stated that "[n]o court should condone the unconstitutional and
possibly criminal behavior of those who planned and executed this
'briefcase caper,' " 27 it declared that such "wilfully lawless activities
undertaken in the name "of law enforcement" must be balanced
"against the considerable harm that would flow from indiscriminate
application of an exclusionary rule." 28 By admitting the evidence in
this type of case, the Court has created a powerful incentive not to
take the substantive rights guaranteed by the fourth amendment
seriously. 29
The Court's jurisprudence suffers from a vacillating perception of
who the beneficiary of the exclusionary rule ought to be. At times the
Court takes an extremely individualistic or "atomistic view" 30 of the
fourth amendment, holding that only those whose personal fourth
amendment rights have been violated may invoke the exclusionary
rule. 31 In other cases, the Court has stressed the collective rather than
individual nature of the exclusionary remedy. 32 Defendants-in these
cases have been denied the exclusionary remedy because, in the opinion of the Court, the deterrent or disincentive value of the remedy was
not worth the cost of exclusion. 33
Were the Court to focus exclusively on the collective or regulatory
27. Payner, 447 U.S. at 733.
28. Payner, 447 U.S. at 734.
29. See Loewy, A Modest Proposal for Fighting Organized Crime: Stop Taking the Fourth
Amendment So Seriously, 16 RUTGERS L.J. 831 (1985).
30. The phrase is Professor Anthony Amsterdam's. See Amsterdam, supra note 6, at 367.
31. See Rakas v. lliinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
32. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433
(1976).
33. Professor Donald Doernberg has attributed this "bifurcated approach" to "the Court's
dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule." Doernberg, "The Right of the People": Reconciling
Collective and Individual Interests Under the Fourth Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 259, 288
(1983). "[T]he problem of today's fourth amendment jurisprudence is that the Court is unwilling
to prescribe the medicament in the cases where it is needed because it dislikes the side effects.
The result is judicial condonation oflawless governmental activity ••.. " Id. at 294-95 (footnotes
omitted). His theory is that the Court regards the exclusionary rule as one of many possible
remedies, and thus chooses to apply it only in a narrow range of circumstances; however,
Doernberg sees this approach as a refusal by the Court to "tailor its remedies" to match the
range of fourth amendment protection that it has acknowledged. Id. at 288. By recognizing an
individual right with respect to questions of standing and then applying a collective remedy
designed to protect society by deterring unlawful police conduct, the Court is "using two analyti·
cally distinct approaches to analyze fourth amendment cases" which are "fundamentally at war
with each other." Id. at 285. Doernberg proposes that the Court alter its standing doctrine by
resurrecting the target theory of standing mentioned in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257
(1960). This would have a dual effect. It would allow the exclusionary rule to serve as an individual remedy for violations of the individual right already acknowledged, Doernberg, supra, at
290, and it would expand the boundaries of the collective remedy to those of the collective right,
"penalizing government conduct which violates the fourth amendment in all, or substantially all,
of the cases in which it occurs." Id. at 296 (footnote omitted).
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nature of the exclusionary rule, its jurisprudence would improve considerably. Such an approach would recognize the substantive nature
of the right which is violated by the search rather than the introduction of illegal evidence at
individual's trial. The Court has conceded that the substantive right violated by an unconstitutional search
or seizure cannot be restored by the exclusionary rule: "The ruptured
privacy of the victims' homes and effects cannot be restored. Reparation comes too late." 34 Furthermore, unlike the fifth or sixth amendments, the fourth amendment speaks of "[t]he right of the people."35
When one couples this language with the historic societal concern
about inadequate controls on government power to search, 36 a jurisprudence that seriously seeks to avoid incentives for unlawful searches
and seizures becomes singularly appropriate.
A good analogy is the establishment of religion clause of the first
amendment. 37 Because the establishment clause is thought to be a collective protection, anybody who is economically hurt by a law that
respects the establishment of religion may challenge that law even
though her own religious freedom is in no way compromised. 38 Similarly, anybody against whom unconstitutionally obtained evidence is
introduced ought to be able to challenge the evidence, even if his
fourth amendment rights were not violated. 39 Such a rule applies in

an

34. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965).
35. "The right of the people to be secure .•• against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated ...." U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV (emphasis added); see Amsterdam, supra note 6, at
367.
36. That societal concern is evidenced by the observation of Justice Jackson:
Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal
of every arbitrary government. And one need only briefly to have dwelt and worked among
a people possessed of many admirable qualities but deprived of these rights to know that the
human personality deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance disappear where homes, persons and possessions are subject at any hour to unheralded search and seizure by the police.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); see supra notes
14-16.
37. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ...." U.S. CoNsr.
amend. I.
38. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430-31 (1961); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,
430-31 (1962). On the other hand, a claim based on the free exercise clause of the first amendment may be made only by one whose personal religious freedom has been infringed. McGowan,
366 U.S. at 429.
39. Perhaps there should be an exception when the victim of a search would be hurt by the
exclusionary rule. For example, when the police conduct an unlawful search of a burglary victim's house and find evidence against the suspect, excluding the evidence may be too much for
the innocent victim of both the search and the burglary to bear. But cf. People v. Jager, 145 Cal.
App. 2d 792, 303 P.2d 115 (1956).
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Louisiana40 and used to apply in California.41 The Supreme Court,
however, values conviction of criminals more than fourth amendment
disincentives. Consequently, it has neither bound states to this broadened standing rule42 nor permitted the rule's use in federal courts.43
Finally, because the exclusionary rule is designed as a disincentive
to conducting unlawful searches and seizures, it should never be applied when the search and seizure is lawful. This apparently obvious
proposition must be stated because both the judiciary# and academy45
have argued that certain types of searches ought to be lawful, but that
evidence obtained from them should be inadmissible. These arguments focus on searches such as automobile inventory searches46 or
40. The Louisiana Constitution states:
Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy. No warrant shall
issue without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, the persons or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason
for the search. Any person adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in violation of

this Section shall have standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate court.
art. I, § 5 (emphasis added).

LA. CoNST.

41. The Supreme Court of California did not agree with the theory that evidence seized in
violation of the fourth amendment should be excluded in order to "provide a remedy for a wrong
done to the defendant, and that accordingly, if the defendant has not been wronged he is entitled
to no remedy." People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 759-60, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (1955). Instead, the
court adopted the exclusionary rule because " 'other remedies have completely failed to secure
compliance with constitutional provisions on the part of police officers with the attendant result
that the courts under the old rule have been constantly required to participate in, and in effect
condone, the lawless activities oflaw enforcement officers.' " 45 Cal. 2d at 760, 290 P.2d at 857
(quoting People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 282 P.2d 905, 911-12 (1955)). The court in
Martin declared that the defendant's "right to object to the use of the evidence must rest, not on
a violation of his own constitutional rights, but on the ground that the government must not be
allowed to profit by its own wrong and thus encouraged in the lawless enforcement of the law."
45 Cal. 2d at 761, 290 P.2d at 857.
The California Constitution has since been amended to overrule Martin. The amendment,
adopted in 1982, provided that "relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceed·
ing," CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 28(d), and is said to have "referendummed into oblivion" the Martin
rule. LaFave, Being Frank About the Fourth: On Allen's "Process of 'Factualization' in the
Search and Seizure Cases," 85 MICH. L. REV. 427, 432 (1986).
42. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
43. An extreme example is United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980), discussed supra at
text accompanying notes 26-28. See generally Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Crimi·
nal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority ofthe Federal Courts, 84 CoLUM.
L. REV. 1433 (1984).
44. The dissent of Judge Ely, in United States v. Mitchell, 458 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1972),
suggests that an "effective compromise" would be "to permit extensive inventory searches of
seized vehicles, so as fully to protect the police, but to forbid, over the objection of one having
standing, the use of any item seized in the search as evidence against the objector." 458 F.2d at
966.
45. See Amsterdam, supra note 6, at 437. Professor Amsterdam proposes, as one of three
possible "curbs" against abuses of the stop and frisk power, that a rule be made which excludes
from evidence everything that an officer finds in the course of a stop-and-frisk except weapons.
46. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S.
367 (1987).
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stop and frisks47 which are permitted on less than probable cause because of the policeman's interest in protecting himself from claims for
lost property (inventory search) or weapons (stop and frisk). Nevertheless, the argument continues, a police officer might conduct such a
search with the ulterior motive of finding evidence of crime. By rendering such evidence inadmissible, no improperly motivated search
would occur, and privacy would only be breached when the officer
really intended to protect property or frisk for weapons.
The problem with this argument is that it provides a remedy when
there may not in fact have been a violation. The exclusionary remedy
is justified only when an underlying right has been violated. If an improper motive is established in one of these types of cases, the search
would be unconstitutional.48 If such a motive cannot be established, it
seems unnecessarily draconian to exclude the evidence because of the
theoretical possibility that it might have been obtained from a search
conducted with impermissible motives. More importantly, such a rule
would mean that if two people are subjected to the same type of
search, only the guilty one would have a remedy. For example, assume that Bill and George are each frisked because a police officer
reasonably suspects that they are armed and dangerous. The officer
feels a hard weapon-like object on Bill's person, which upon inspection
turns out to be a bottle containing heroin. George is also subjected to
the indignity of a frisk, 49 which, because he is an honest law-abiding
citizen, turns up nothing. Under the proposed exclusionary rule, the
heroin could not be introduced against Bill, but because the search
was lawful George would have no recourse against the police officer. 50
Such ~le would be appropriate if the focus of the constitutional
47. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
48. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64-66 (1968); Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376; Benine,
479 U.S. at 375.
49. The indignity that might be felt could be that described in Terry v. Ohio: "'The officer
must feel with sensitive fingers every portion of the prisoner's body. A thorough search must be
made of the prisoner's arms and armpits, waistlliie and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to the feet.'" 392 U.S. at 17, n.13 (quoting Priar &
Martin, Searching and Disarming Criminals, 45 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 481
(1954)). After describing this procedure, the Court concluded that "it is simply fantastic to urge
that such a procedure [as a stop and frisk] performed in public by a policeman while the citizen
stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a 'petty indignity.' " 392 U.S. at
16-17.
50. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), in which Officer McFadden became suspicious of Terry,
Chilton, and Katz because they were conducting a "casual and oft-repeated reconnaissance" of a
store window, is a good example. 392 U.S. at 6. Officer McFadden suspected them of "'casing a
job, a stick-up,' " and added that he feared "'they may have a gun.' " 392 U.S. at 6. Officer
McFadden 'approached the men, and when they "'mumbled something' " in response to his inquiries, Officer McFadden patted down the outside of Terry's clothing and found a pistol. Officer
McFadden then proceeded to pat down the outer clothing of Chilton and found another revolver.
He next checked Katz in the same way but he found no weapons. 392 U.S. at 7. Under the
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guarantee were against the use of evidence because the wrong would
consist of its use at trial. 51 Where, however, the constitutional provision is primarily concerned with obtaining evidence, such a rule is entirely inappropriate. Here, the exclusionary remedy should apply only
when evidence was acquired by police misconduct.
II. MIRANDA VIOLATIONS

Compared to Miranda, the rationale for the fourth amendment exclusionary rule is a paragon of simplicity. It is not clear whether the
Court disallows confessions obtained in violation of Miranda because
they were obtained improperly or because their use is improper. Language in both Miranda 52 and its progeny53 can be found to support
either conclusion. Miranda's holding, however, focuses on the impropriety of use: "Our holding ... briefly stated ... is this: The prosecuproposed rule, Katz would have no recourse against McFadden, but Terry and Chilton would go
free.
51. See infra Sections II, Ill, and IV.
52. The following statements suggest that obtaining the confession is improper: "[W]e hold
that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination
is jeopardized." 384 U.S. at 478. "The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at
odds with one of our Nation's most cherished principles - that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself." 384 U.S. at 457-58. "In fact, the Government concedes- ••• '[w)e
have no doubt ..• that it is possible for a suspect's Fifth Amendment right to be violated during
in-custody questioning by a law-enforcement officer.' " 384 U.S. at 463 (quoting Brief for the
United States at 28, Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (No. 761) (companion case
to Miranda)). Other language suggests that the Court's only concern was the use of the confessions: "The warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion today
are ... prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant." 384 U.S. at 476.
The Court did not allow a distinction to be drawn between exculpatory and inculpatory statements for purposes of requiring the warnings, as exculpatory statements "are incriminating in
any meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without the full warnings and effective
waiver required for any other statement." 384 U.S. at 477 (emphasis added). In summarizing,
the Court stated that "unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.'' 384
U.S. at 479.
53. The Court in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), reviewed the Miranda decision
and found that "the Court in Miranda, for the first time, expressly declared that the Self-Incrimination Clause was applicable to state interrogations at a police station, and that a defendant's
statements might be excluded at trial despite their voluntary character under traditional principles." 417 U.S. at 443. Although this sounds like the Court is concerned with obtaining the
confession and enforcing that concern with an exclusionary rule, the Court went on to describe
Miranda as holding that "statements taken in violation of the Miranda principles must not be
used to prove the prosecution's case at trial." 417 U.S. at 445 (emphasis added).
The Court also reviewed Miranda in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), where it
found that "[t]he Miranda decision was based in large part on this Court's view that the warnings which it required police to give to suspects in custody would reduce the likelihood that the
suspects would fall victim to constitutionally impermissible practices of police interrogation in the
presumptively coercive environment of the station house." 467 U.S. at 656 (emphasis added).
On the other hand, in announcing its holding, the Court said: ·~we hold that on these facts there
is a 'public safety' exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence ..•." 467 U.S. at 655 (emphasis added).
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tion may not use statements . . . stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. "54 Because of the overall ambiguity of the Court's language,
however, coupled with its failure to focus on the unconstitutionally
obtained/unconstitutionally used dichotomy, the "holding" language
does not necessarily settle the issue.
Nevertheless, for the reasons that follow, I will argue that the Miranda doctrine ought to focus on the impropriety of using rather than
obtaining the evidence. Put differently, Miranda should be viewed as a
trial-rights case rather than a police-practices case. Under this reasoning, courts should not care whether or not Miranda is violated so long
as no evidence obtained from the violation is introduced against the
person from whom it was obtained. Similarly, no police officer should
be subject to a law suit for obtaining a confession in violation of
Miranda. 55
For purposes of discussion, consider the California case of People
v. Varnum, 56 in which the state learned the location of a gun from
questioning Mr. and Mrs. Jackson, two of Varnum's apparent accomplices, in a manner inconsistent with Miranda. 57 At that time, under
California law, Varnum had standing to challenge the introduction of
evidence obtained in violation of another's constitutional rights. 58
Consequently, Varnum's ability to have the evidence excluded from
his trial turned on what constituted a violation of the Jacksons' Miranda rights. If obtaining a statement from the Jacksons without Miranda warnings violated their constitutional rights, a court could not
admit the evidence against Varnum. On the other hand, if the Jacksons' Miranda rights were not violated unless and until the evidence
was used against them, Varnum could not object to the use of the
evidence against him.
The California Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Traynor, upheld
54. 384 U.S. at 444 (emphasis added).
55. See Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1263 (10th Cit. 1976); Hampton v. Gilmore, 60
F.R.D. 71 (E.D. Mo. 1973), ajfd., 486 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir. 1973); Ambrek v. Clark, 287 F. Supp.
208 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
.
56. 66 Cal. 2d 808, 427 P.2d 772 (1967).
57. The police officers had conducted a "fruitless search for the gun throughout the building
where the Jacksons lived. They then prevailed upon Jackson, who was in jail and had confessed,
to telephone his wife, who was in the women's jail, and ask her to reveal the hiding place of the
gun. Mrs. Jackson said it was in the fuse box in the hallway of the apartment building, where an
officer later found it. The officers thus learned of the hiding place of the gun from both Jackson
and his wife who had not been advised of their constitutional rights." 66 Cal. 2d at 811, 427 P.2d
at 775.
·
58. See supra note 41.
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Varnum's conviction, apparently accepting that Miranda protected
against the use of illegal evidence. It noted that "[t]he basis for the
warnings required by Miranda is the privilege against self-incrimination ... , and that privilege is not violated when the information elicited from an unwarned suspect is not used against him." 5 9 In dissent,
Justice Peters argued that it is
"unlawful" to interrogate a suspect without giving him the required
warnings from the very moment of the first question. The right of privacy referred to in Escobedo 60 and Miranda has been violated the moment interrogation starts. The fact that the most important sanction
imposed for violating that right of privacy is inadmissibility of the confession into evidence, and that the defendant cannot complain in his
criminal trial unless the confession is introduced, does not make the interrogation lawful. The same can be said about an unlawful search and
seizure; yet there is no doubt that the unlawful search is unlawful when
committed, and not when the fruits are introduced into evidence. The
one thing made crystal clear by Escobedo and certainly by the explanation of that case in Miranda is that it is unlawful to interrogate without
giving the required warnings. 61

In the remainder of this section, I will explain why Chief Justice Traynor's understanding of Miranda is correct and Justice Peters' analogy
to the fourth amendment misses the mark.
Because the primary purpose of Miranda is to implement the privilege against self-incrimination, an obvious starting point is the language of that constitutional provision: "No person . . . shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... " 62
The language indicates concern with the use of evidence at a criminal
trial. It is not enough that disclosure of the information subjects an
individual to public humiliation. Some might argue that since one can
invoke the fifth amendment in noncriminal proceedings the amendment protects against any suffering associated with the revelation of
damaging facts. As a result, Miranda rights might be thought violated
anytime police force disclosure of damaging evidence. Admittedly,
the amendment has been raised in noncriminal proceedings such as
civil, 63 administrative, 64 or legislative proceedings. 65 But such invoca59. 66 Cal. 2d at 812, 427 P.2d at 775 (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Commn., 378 U.S. 52,
78-79 (1964)).
60. Referring to Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 475 (1964), a pre-Miranda case, which held n
confession obtained in the absence of counsel to be inadmissible because of the sixth amendment's guarantee of counsel.
61. 66 Cal. 2d at 817, 427 P.2d at 778-79.
62. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
63. "The privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in which the
testimony is sought or is to be used. It applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever
the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it." McCarthy v.
Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924).
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tion is allowed only because without it, the statements could be subsequently introduced in a criminal proceeding. If a witness receives
immunity from use of the statements, or anything derived therefrom,
in a subsequent criminal trial, the witness may be compelled to testify
in a noncriminal proceeding. 66 Consequently, it is not accurate to say
that the fifth amendment is applicable to noncriminal proceedings as
such.
It is sometimes argued that the fifth amendment should be construed more broadly. Justice Peters, for example, deemed it to be part
of a general right of privacy. Such a right of privacy would be violated
anytime police illegally obtained damaging information. A similar argument was made and rejected by the Supreme Court many years ago
in Brown v. Walker. 61 In Brown, a grand jury witness invoked the
privilege against self incrimination in regard to a crime for which he
had been granted complete immunity. 68 Justice Field, in dissent,
would have found for the witness: "The [fifth] amendment also protects. him from all compulsory testimony which might expose him to
infamy and disgrace, though the facts disclo~ed might not lead to a
criminal prosecution." 69 Directly confronting this argument, the
Court held:
The design of the constitutional privilege is not to aid the witness in
vindicating his character, but to protect him against being compelled to
furnish evidence to convict him of a criminal charge. If he secures legal
immunity from prosecution, the possible impairment of his good name is
a penalty which it is reasonable he should be compelled to pay for the
common good. 70

Although an occasional Justice has lamented the failure of the Field
view to gain acceptance, 71 the Supreme Court has unequivocally ad64. I.C.C. v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
65. Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155
(1955).
66.
[W]hen a witness is compelled by district court order to testify over a claim of the privilege,
"the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any
information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be
used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false
statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order."
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 448-49 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 6002).
67. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
68. Complete or "transactional" immunity provides greater protection than is mandated by
the Constitution. One who receives it cannot be prosecuted for the crime about which he
testifies.
69. 161 U.S. at 631.
70. 161 U.S. at 605-06.
71. See, e.g., Douglas, J., dissenting in Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 448-55
(1956).
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hered to the view that a grant of immunity from prosecution precludes
reliance on the privilege against self-incrimination. 72
Cons\:!quently, it would seem clear that a legislature could authorize police officers to interrogate suspects without Miranda warnings,
so long as it provided immunity from the use of any statements obtained therefrom. For example, the Court should have no difficulty
upholding the following hypothetical statute:
An Act To Aid the Police in Obtaining Necessary Information
Whenever a police officer believes it to be necessary to obtain information from a person in custody, he may subject that person to custodial
interrogation without warning the suspect of any of his rights. Neither
the statement, nor any evidence derived from the statement, shall be admissible against the person so interrogated.

If such a statute would be constitutional, what about judicial immunity which accomplishes the same purpose? A possible analogue is
the type of case in which a witness pleads the fifth amendment, and,
despite the lack of statutory immunity, the judge orders her to te~tify.
Under these circumstances, the defendant has a choice. If she refuses
to testify and she is held in contempt, the appellate court will reverse
her contempt conviction because of her privilege against self-incrimination. 73 If she chooses to testify, however, she will be granted "use
immunity" - that is, an appeals court would find use of that evidence
unconstitutional. 74 Although one could argue that the appellate
court's reversal of the contempt conviction or the imposition of use
immunity are merely remedies to redress the wrong committed by the
lower court judge in compelling testimony,75 there is no basis for concluding that the fifth amendment interest is not completely vindicated. 76 Rather, the court would have prevented or addressed the only
constitutional wrong - the use of unconstitutional evidence to obtain
a criminal conviction.
Furthermore, sound policy sometimes dictates obtaining statements from possible defendants with knowledge that the statements
72. Although the Court has occasionally explained the privilege against self-incrimination as
one resting on concepts of privacy, see, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-57 (1961), nothing
substantial has ever turned on that categorization.
73. Cf. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
74. See In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 609 F.2d 867, 872 n.11 (7th Cir. 1979); cf.
Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954).
75. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 644 F.2d 70, 78 & n.13 (2d Cir. 1981).
76. A witness' fifth amendment interest may be vindicated either by silence or immunity.
The state, and not the defendant, normally chooses which method it prefers. See generally Westen & Mandell, To Talk, Balk, or To Lie: The Emerging Fifth Amendment Doctrine of the "Prefe"ed Response," 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 521 (1982). When the state, through its judge, compels
the witness to testify over her fifth amendment objections, however, it cannot complain about the
witness' resulting immunity.
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cannot be used against that person. Such statements may well lead to .
evidence against a codefendant which would eliminate the need to seek
a confession from the codefendant himself. Consider, for example,
Dimmick v. State, 77 a robbery case in which the prosecution's principal evidence was the victim's identification of Dimmick as one of the
robbers. To buttress this identification, the prosecutor introduced the
testimony of Lee Herman, who admitted committing the robbery with
Dimmick. Herman's testimony was presumably compelled because of
a confession given to police - a confession made after the victim
failed to identify him and after the police ignored his request for counsel. "In the words of the police officer 'the decision was made to go
ahead and interview him [Herman] after he had requested an attorney
full-well knowing that the confession could not be used against him
but merely for the value of the confession against Mr. Dimmick.' " 78
The entire Alaska Supreme Court considered questioning Herman after he had requested counsel to be a constitutional wrong which ought
to be redressed. By a divided vote, however, the court affirmed Dimmick's conviction, concluding that the appropriate remedy ought to be
a civil rights action by Herman against the police officers.
Contrary to the opinion of the Alaska Supreme Court, questioning
Herman was not a violation of anybody's constitutional rights and
should not give rise to a civil suit. Rather, it was an effort to corroborate the victim's identification of Dimmick by extrinsic evidence. The
principal police alternative to Herman's eyewitness testimony would
have been to seek a confession from Dimmick himself. Such conduct
would run afoul of the too often ignored observation of Escobedo v.
Illinois:
We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern, that a system
of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the "confession"
will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a
system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured
through skillful investigation. 79

Because, unlike fourth amendment rights, fifth amendment rights are
not violated unless and until the statement is used against the person
making it, the court should have commended, rather than condemned,
the police, whose conduct led to a conviction based on extrinsic evidence80 without relying on a confession from the defendant on trial. 81
77. 473 P.2d 616 (Alaska 1970).
78. 473 P.2d at 619.
79. 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1964).
80. Although Herman's confession would certainly not be "extrinsic" in his own case, it was
"extrinsic" as to Dimmick.
81. The court concluded that the police had no probable cause to arrest Herman. 473 P.2d
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Another type of case in which the police might wish to question
without (or inconsistent with) Miranda warnings is one in which they
already have enough evidence against one defendant, but wish to obtain additional evidence against, or information about, his cohorts.
For example, consider a hypothetical based on Oregon v. Elstad, 82 a
case in which the police interrogated eighteen-year-old Michael Elstad
about the burglary of a neighbor's house without giving him Miranda
warnings. 83 Assume that (1) Mrs. Gross (the victimized neighbor)
had seen Elstad and some men she could not identify running from the
house, (2) the police were able to identify Elstad's fingerprints on the
broken door, and (3) a friend of Elstad had reported to the police that
Elstad had told her that he had burglarized the Gross house. Under
these circumstances, it would have beel_l entirely appropriate for the
police to question Elstad without warnings as part of an effort to ascertain the identity of, and evidence against, his cohorts. Such statements
would, of course, be inadmissible against Elstad. But because they already have a case against him, it is eminently sensible to give him use
immunity regarding this additional information in order to track down
his cohorts.
In addition to situations in which the police forgo evidence against
one criminal in order to obtain evidence against cohorts, there are
cases in which something other than evidentiary concerns motivates a
police officer's question. For example, there may actually be a situation in which the officer wants to insure a "Christian burial." 84 More
likely, the officer may want to ascertain whether a murder has been
committed, if so, where the body has been buried, and, if not, where
at 619. Consequently, his fourth amendment rights may have been violated. See Brown v. Illi·
nois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975). To the extent that they were, my laudatory description of the police
conduct would be unwarranted. The court's analysis, however, is predicated on the assumption
that Herman's Miranda rights were violated, and it is with this analysis that I disagree.
82. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
83. The police first interrogated Elstad at his house. As Officer Burke testified,
"I sat down with Mr. Elstad and I asked him if he was aware of why Detective McAllister
and myself were there to talk with him. He stated no, he had no idea why we were there. I
then asked him if he knew a person by the name of Gross, and he said yes, he did, and also
added that he heard that there was a robbery at the Gross house. And at that point I told
Mr. Elstad that I felt he was involved in that, and he looked at me and stated, 'Yes, I was
there.'"
470 U.S. at 301 (quoting app. 19-20). Elstad was then taken to the sheriff's headquarters, where
he was advised of his Miranda rights for the first time. He subsequently gave a full statement,
which was typed, reviewed and then signed by Elstad. 470 U.S. at 301. The first confession was
elicited without administering Miranda warnings. Nevertheless, the Court held the self-incrimi·
nation clause of the fifth amendment does not require the suppression of a confession, made after
proper Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of rights, solely because the police had obtained an
earlier voluntary but unwarned admission from the suspect.
84. The reference, of course, is to the notorious Williams cases. See Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387 (1977); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
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the live kidnap victim has been taken. 85 Or the officer might really
fear that a small child will pick up a discarded gun and kill herself. 86
To the extent that nonevidentiary motives actually influence the police
in these kinds of situations, police should feel free to question, secure
in the knowledge that so long as neither the answers nor anything
derived from the answers is used against the suspect, the Constitution
has not been violated.
Perhaps the most illustrative case to reach the Supreme Court is
New York v. Quarles, 87 in which police arrested a suspect in a super.:
market, after a rape victim described the suspect and his hiding place.
As the police entered the supermarket, Quarles retreated towards the
rear of the store until he was run down and arrested by Officer Kraft.
Upon capturing Quarles, Kraft holstered his gun and frisked him.
Quarles by this time was being guarded by three other officers who
were pointing guns at him. After finding no weapon, Kraft handcuffed
Quarles and the other officers holstered their guns, whereupon Kraft
asked: "Where is the gun?" 88 Quarles pointed to some cartons a few
feet away and said: "The gun is over there." 89 Kraft then retrieved a
loaded revolver from behind the cartons.
The Court unanimously agreed that the police violated no constitutional right of Quarles by ascertaining the location of the gun from
him without giving him Miranda warnings. 90 It also unanimously
agreed that if Quarles' statement were actually compelled, the statement would be inadmissible. 91 These two steps were correct. Admis85. For example, in a case frighteningly similar to Williams that occurred in my home town
of Chapel Hill, North Carolina, the District Attorney and defense attorney plea bargained for the
defendant to reveal the location of the body in exchange for the prosecutor's not seeking the
death penalty.
86. The reference is to Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 294-95 (1980), in which a policeman's statement, "God forbid one of them [handicapped children] might find a weapon with
shells and they might hurt themselves~]" induced an incriminating response. Whether the safety
of children actually motivated the police in that case is debatable. See White, Rhode Island v.
Innis: The Significance of a Suspect's Assertion of His Right to Counsel, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
53, 68-69 (1979).
87. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
88. 467 U.S. at 675 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
89. 467 U.S. at 675.
90. "[W]e believe that this case presents a situation where concern for public safety must be
paramount to adherence to the literal language of the prophylactic rules enunciated in Miranda."
467 U.S. at 653 (Rehnquist, J., for the Court). "Miranda has never been read to prohibit the
police from asking questions to secure the public safety." 467 U.S. at 664 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "If a bomb is about to explode or the public is otherwise
imminently imperiled, the police are free to interrogate suspects without advising them of their
constitutional rights. . • • All the Fifth Amendment forbids is the introduction of coerced statements at trial." 467 U.S. at 686 (Marshall, J., dissenting, with Brennan and Stevens, JJ.).
91. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, stated:
The dissent curiously takes us to task for "endors[ing] the introduction of coerced selfincriminating statements in criminal prosecutions," and for "sanctioning sub si/entio crimi-
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sion of compelled confessions, not police misconduct, is necessary for
a Miranda violation. However, by a five to four vote, in an opinion by
Justice Rehnquist, the Court went on to hold that the conclusive presumption of coercion which normally follows a failure to give Miranda
warnings was inapplicable to a confession obtained in order to preserve the public safety. The Court apparently permitted Quarles' nonMirandized statement to be admitted because a legitimate nonevidentiary motive meant that there had been no police misconduct.
The Court's refusal to follow the Miranda presumption seems
strange. As Justice O'Connor understated: "[T]here is nothing about
an exigency that makes custodial interrogation any less compelling .... "92 Or, as Justice Marshall put it: "The 'public safety' exception is efficacious precisely because it permits police officers to coerce
defendants into making involuntary statements." 93 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any handcuffed, unarmed man, who would feel free to
ignore the urgent request of an armed policeman backed up by three
other armed policemen, especially when the policeman has not indicated a willingness to take "no" for an answer by giving Miranda
warnings. 94 Furthermore, the very nature of public safety needs is
such that one would expect more police coercion in such a situation
than any place else. Consequently, one would think that the public
safety situation would be the most appropriate place to apply the Miranda presumption.
The best explanation for the majority's opinion is its conclusion
that excluding the evidence would be "penalizing officers for asking
the very questions which are the most crucial to their efforts to protect
themselves and the public. " 95 The Court analyzed the case as a police
practices case. Since the Court was disinclined to "punish" police for
what it saw as appropriate conduct, the Court refused to exclude the
evidence. If, however, the majority had understood Miranda as a trial
rights case rather than a police practices case, there would have been
nal prosecutions based on compelled self-incriminating statements." Of course our decision
today does nothing of the kind.... [R]espondent is certainly free on remand to argue that
his statement was coerced under traditional due process standards. Today we merely reject
the only argument that respondent has raised to support the exclusion of his statement, that
the statement must be presumed compelled because of Officer Kraft's failure to read him his
Miranda warnings.
467 U.S. at 655 n.5 (citations omitted). The four dissenting Justices would have held the statement inadmissible on the basis of presumed coercion. See infra text accompanying notes 92-93.
92. 467 U.S. at 665 (concurring and dissenting opinion).
93. 467 U.S. at 685 (dissenting opinion).
94. If Quarles were reprosecuted, the evidence might be inadmissible as a coerced confession
under the fifth amendment. See infra text accompanying notes 146-48. According to the Court,
Quarles had not raised the issue at trial, but was free to raise it on appeal. See supra note 91.
95. 467 U.S. at 658 n.7.
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no occasion to talk about "penalizing officers." We do not talk about
penalizing Congressmen or penalizing prosecutors when those whom
they have compelled to testify are granted use immunity. The problem
in Quarles is that the focus on police misconduct prevented the Court
from remedying the actual Miranda violation which occurred not
when Kraft asked about the gun, but when Quarles' response was admitted as evidence. Of course, the Court did say that if the confession
is truly coerced, it is inadmissible. Presumably, in such a case, the
Court thinks the police deserve to be "penalized." 96 Because in a true
emergency, however, the police are, or ought to be, at their coercive
best, failure to apply the Miranda presumption seems singularly
inappropriate.
If my analysis has been correct, one might wonder about the value
of Miranda. The Court has told us that the Miranda rules are not
required by the privilege against self-incrimination, but are "prophylactic standards [designed] to safeguard that privilege." 97 What value
is a prophylactic standard designed to insure compliance by preventing police misconduct, if compliance is not a proper goal of the judiciary? The answer is that the Court has articulated two prophylactic
rationales for Miranda. One is designed to insure that no involuntary
statements are admitted, even at the cost of excluding some voluntary
ones. The other rationale, like the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule, is designed to deter noncompliance. The first of these rationales
is legitimate; the second is not.98
The legitimate Miranda prophylactic rationale is as follows: There
are a substantial number of confessions obtained during custodial interrogation that are in fact coerced. Because of the secrecy of a custodial interrogation that involves only the police and the suspect, it is
extraordinarily difficult to ascertain whether a particular confession is
in fact compelled. Furthermore, attempting such ascertainment in
every case would be so time consuming that courts, especially the
Supreme Court, would be unable to do it. 99 Consequently, a number
of confessions that were in fact compelled would be introduced against
defendants. Inasmuch as the privilege against compelled self-incrimi96. But see infra text accompanying notes 146-48.
97. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974).
98. For a general discussion of prophylactic rules, see Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic
Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 190 (1988); Grano, Miranda'.!- Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to
Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 174 (1988); Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal
Procedure: A Question ofArticle III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 100 (1985); Monaghan, The
Supreme Court, 1974 Term - Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1975).
99. See Miranda, 384 U.S at 475-76; Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REv.
435, 446-53 (1987).
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nation is a fundamental component of our constitutional fabric, it is
better for the prosecution to be deprived of a few voluntary statements
than to risk convicting a defendant with a compelled self-incriminating statement. 100 This rule is especially appropriate when at the time
of announcing the presumption of coercion, the Court explicitly indicates to the police the precise methodology for overcoming the presumption. Although one could argue that the Miranda rules require
the police to give too many 101 or too few10 2 warnings, those rules seem
a reasonable compromise to ensure that compelled self-incrimination
is not permitted in the courts of this nation. 103
The illegitimate prophylactic rationale seeks to deter police violations of Miranda by imposing an exclusionary rule on confessions obtained following such violations. The problem with this approach is
that the fifth amendment does not contain an exclusionary rule; it is
itself an exclusionary rule. The substantive right is the right not to
have compelled confessions used against the confessor at trial. Consequently, the line of cases that have refused to apply Miranda because it
would have no impact on police conduct misses the mark. These cases
hold that a Miranda-presumed coerced confession is not to be equated
with a real coerced confession. Rather, the Miranda-presumed coerced confession is only to be excluded when exclusion would have a
significant deterrent effect on police behavior.
The development of this rationale began in Harris v. New York, 104
where the Court allowed statements obtained in violation of Miranda
to impeach the defendant's credibility. Without even considering
whether Miranda should be analyzed as an exclusionary rule case, the
Court held: "Assuming that the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect on proscribed police conduct, sufficient deterrence flows when the
evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case
in chief." 105 Had the Court viewed these statements as actually rather
than presumptively compelled, however, use immunity would have
precluded their use, even for impeachment purposes. 106
100. Cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
101. See Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417 (1985); Grano, Selling the
Idea To Tell the Truth: The Professional Inte"ogator and Modern Confession Law (Book Review) 84 MICH. L. REv. 662 (1986).
102. See Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal To Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1826 (1987); Schulhofer, supra note 99; White, Defending Miranda:
Reply to Professor Caplan, 39 VAND. L. REv. l, 10, 21 (1986).
103. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424-27 (1986).
104. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
105. 401 U.S. at 225.
106. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385
(1978). Other illustrations of this approach include Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), in
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An unfortunate byproduct of the Court's focus on deterrence has
been to engender unnecessary debate on whether a particular nonapplication of Miranda will weaken its deterrent effect. 107 Much more
significantly, however, the emphasis on this illegitimate Miranda prophylactic has weakened its legitimate prophylactic value. Under the
law as it now stands, when the state seeks to impeach a witness with a
prior inconsistent confession, 108 or introduce evidence derived from a
confession, 109 the actual as opposed to the presumptive coerciveness of
the confession must be litigated. Consequently, all of the concerns of
secret interrogations, inaccurate determinations of compulsion, inadequate judicial time, and the possibility of unconstitutionally compelled
confessions contributing to convictions have retumed. 110 Perhaps this
occurrence is inevitable when the Court that construes a prior decision, such as Miranda, grudgingly tolerates rather than openly embraces that decision. 111 Nevertheless, deterrence analysis has no place
in fifth amendment jurisprudence. If the Court cannot accept Miwhich the Court allowed the testimony of a witness who would not have been discovered without
the confession, and Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), where the Court upheld a confession
that might not have been obtained had it not been for an earlier improperly induced confession.
Once again, had the statements been actually rather than presumptively compelled, the derivative evidence would have been excluded under use immunity.
107. For example, in their criticism of Harris, Professors John Hart Ely and Alan Dershowitz spend nearly three full pages meticulously disproving the claim that the Harris result is
consistent with the deterrence desired by Miranda. See Ely & Dershowitz, Harris v. New York:
Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE
· L.J. 1198, 1218-21 (1971). Similarly, in Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), Justice Brennan,
dissenting from an extension of Harris to a case in which the defendant was questioned after he
had invoked his right to counsel, criticized the Court for further weakening the deterrent value of
Miranda:
Even after Harris, police had some incentive for following Miranda by warning an accused
of his [rights]. If the warnings were given, the accused might still make a statement which
could be used in the prosecution's case in chief. Under today's holding, however, once the
warnings are given, police have almost no incentive for following Miranda's requirement
that "[i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until
an attorney is present." Miranda, [384 U.S.] at 474. If the requirement is followed there
will almost surely be no statement since the attorney will advise the accused to remain silent.
If, however, the requirement is disobeyed, the police may obtain a statement which can be
used for impeachment if the accused has the temerity to te5tify in his own defense.
420 U.S. at 725 (footnotes omitted). ·
Because the Court in both Harris and Hass claimed that those decisions did not adversely
impact on Miranda's deterrent value, I do not criticize either Professors Ely and Dershowitz or
Justice Brennan for challenging those claims. Rather, I question the relevance of the issue.
108. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
109. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
Although Elstad suggested that prior Supreme Court decisions had held evidence obtained from
a Miranda violation to be admissible against the person questioned, 470 U.S. at 307-08, no
Supreme Court case has held that all such evidence is "untainted fruit." At the very least, however, the Court perceives Miranda as having short coattails.
110. See Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court (Book Review), 79 MICH. L. REV. 865
(1981).
111. The opinions in cases like Harris, Tucker, Quarles, and Elstad (discussed above) all read
like efforts to explain away or narrow Miranda rather than to embrace it openly.
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randa for its proper fifth amendment value, perhaps it should overrule
it. Preferably, it should take that fifth amendment value seriously.

III.

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence." 112 This clause is frequently invoked when the police obtain evidence, such as a confession or lineup identification, without
counsel. 113
Cases involving confessions obtained in the absence of counsel bear
a surface resemblance to those in which confessions are obtained in
violation of Miranda. Indeed, in some cases, the rationales are almost
interchangeable. 114 They do vindicate different interests, however.
While Miranda concerns compulsion, the right to counsel cases are
concerned with the integrity of the adversarial process. Consequently,
they forbid the use of confessions deliberately elicited in the absence of
counsel, even under circumstances that are neither actually nor presumptively compelling.11s
In Massiah v. United States, 116 the Court suggested, but stopped
short of holding, that the sixth amendment's right to counsel permits
deliberately eliciting confessions, so long as they are not used against
the person from whom they were elicited. 117 The opinion indicated a
willingness to analyze the sixth amendment as a procedural right,
prohibiting the use of unconstitutional evidence. In line with this reasoning but more explicitly, the Court has clearly held that the right to
112. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
113. See, e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (confession); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (lineup identification).
114. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). See generally Kamisar, Brewer v•
. Williams, Massiah and Miranda: What Is Interrogation? When Does It Matter?, 61 GEO. L.J, 1
(1978).
115. For example, in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), and Maine v. Moulton,
474 U.S. 159 (1985), the confessions were elicited by the defendant's own cohort; and in United
States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), the elicitor was a fellow inmate. Bllt cf. Kuhlman v.
Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
116. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
117.
We do not question that in this case, as in many cases, it was entirely proper to continue an
investigation of the suspected criminal activities of the defendant and his alleged confederates, even though the defendant had already been indicted. All we hold is that the defendant's own incriminating statements, obtained by federal agents under the circumstances
here disclosed, could not constitutionally be used by the prosecution as evidence against him
at his trial.
Massiah, 377 U.S. at 207 (emphasis in original). Because the Court did not explicitly approve
eliciting statements as one of the "entirely proper" means of investigation, I have employed the
cautionary textual language: "suggested, but stopped short of holding •.•• "
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counsel exists to insure the fairness of the trial. The right only applies
to confrontations occurring after the onset of formal judicial proceedings.118 Even then, if the stage is not critical, the right to counsel will
not apply. Relying on such logic, the Court has held the right to
counsel to be inapplicable to blood tests, 119 post-indictment handwriting exemplars, 120 and even post-indictment pictorial lineups. 121 Consequently, it seems likely that, if pushed, the Court would hold that
the deliberate elicitation of a post-indictment confession, if the confession is not introduced at trial, does not occur during a critical stage of
the proceedings, and therefore does not ·constitute a violation of the
sixth amendment.122
Ascertaining the nature of the right to counsel is especially important when the state claims a legitimate justification for deliberately
eliciting a confession. Only in this way can a court assess when the
right has been violated. For example, in Maine v. Moulton, 123
Moulton, and his codefendant Colson, had been indicted for four theft
offenses (hereinafter called series A crimes). Colson, represented by
counsel, voluntarily confessed to the police that he and Moulton had
committed the series A crimes. In addition, Colson implicated himself
and Moulton in several other crimes and indicated that Moulton had
discussed killing a potential witness against him (series B crimes).
Colson agreed to be wired with a transmitting device and, while so
wired, deliberately elicited incriminating statements from Moulton regarding both series A and series B crimes. The state argued that inasmuch as it had a legitimate interest in deliberately eliciting
incriminating statements about series B crimes, it was justified in its
actions. Because it could not elicit information about sepes B crimes
without also eliciting information about series A crimes, the state contended that that information also was properly obtained, and should
be admissible.
The Court had several potential solutions to the case. At one extreme, it could have held that since the right to counsel had already
attached for series A crimes, the police (through Colson) had no right
to deliberately elicit incriminating statements about them. If the state
could not elicit incriminating statements about series B crimes without
118.
(1977).
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Compare Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), with Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765-66 (1966).
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967).
United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
Cf. Ransom v. City of Philadelphia, 311 F. Supp. 973, 974 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
474 U.S. 159 (1985).
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also eliciting statements about series A crimes, it would be obligated to
forgo eliciting statements about any crime. By eschewing that course
of actjon and deliberately eliciting statements about all crimes, the police violated Moulton's sixth amendment rights. Consequently, not
only is all 1of the evidence inadmissible, but Moulton should prevail in
a civil rights action against the police who violated his sixth amendment rights. Such an approach would view the sixth amendment as a
substantive protection against obtaining evidence in this manner, and
would impose a remedial exclusionary rule on any of the evidence. No
Justice maintained such a position.
Speaking for the Court, Justice Brennan appeared to hold that the
state violated Moulton's sixth amendment rights when it elicited statements about his series A crimes: "Accordingly, the Sixth Amendment
is violated when the State obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the accused's right to have counsel present in a
confrontation between the accused and a state agent." 124 On the other
hand, it upheld the state's conduct in eliciting statements about series
B crimes because the statements had not been unconstitutionally acquired. The net result of the holdings was to exclude the tainted statements relating to series A crimes, but admit the properly obtained
statements relating to series B crimes. Although the opinion seemed
predicated on the impropriety of certain police practices, it failed to
articulate a clear standard of behavior, making it extremely difficult
for a lawyer to tell a police officer in the Moulton situation whether or
not he was acting constitutionally.
Chief Justice Burger, for the dissent, had no difficulty with this
question. In~his view, the need to obtain Moulton's statements about
series B crimes legitimated the entire process. As he saw it, the right
to counsel did not attach, thereby leaving no unconstitutional behavior
to deter, and rendering both series A and series B statements admissible. Indeed, Burger went further and argued that even if the right to
counsel did apply to the series A statements, the exclusionary rule
should not be invoked to preclude their use: "Like searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the 'wrong' that the Court condemns
was 'fully accomplished' by the elicitation of comments from the defendant and 'the exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able to cure
the invasion of the defendant's rights which he has already suffered.' " 125 Obviously, the Chief Justice believed that obtaining rather
124. 474 U.S. at 176 (emphasis added).
125. 474 U.S. at 191 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1974)).
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than using the evidence was the wrong protected against by the sixth
amendment.
The Court should have held that none of the police conduct was
improper. In view of the need to obtain series B statements, there is
no reason to cast doubt on the propriety of the procedure. 126 On the
other hand, there is every reason to take Moulton's sixth amendment
rights seriously. Because the sixth amendment is a procedural right
that applies only to critical stages of criminal proceedings, it can be
fully honored by disallowing the evidence for series A crimes. By so
holding, the stage at which the statements were obtained becomes noncritical, thereby rendering counsel unnecessary. Of course, the series
B statements should be admissible because there was no right to counsel regarding the series B crimes.
Although this result is identical to that reached by the Court, it
reaches it through a more direct route. Unlike the Court's opinion, it
casts no aspersions on the legality of the police conduct. It allows the
Court to vindicate legitimate governmental interests without ignoring
serious. constitutional rights. Most importantly, it renders analysis of
the exclusionary rule absolutely irrelevant. Any statement deliberately elicited from a suspect after the commencement of adversary
proceedings would automatically be inadmissible if the suspect were
without the aid of counsel. The justification for disallowing such evidence would not be the "exclusionary rule," but the sixth amendment's rules governing fair trials.
In view of the obviously procedural nature of the right to counsel,
where did the fourth amendment exclusionary remedy type of analysis
originate? The first Supreme Court case to employ it appears to have
been Gilbert v. California, 127 in which the Court held that a post-indictment lineup identification obtained in the absence of counsel was
per se inadmissible: 12s
That testimony is the direct result of the illegal lineup "come at by the
exploitation of [the primary] illegality." The State is therefore not entitled to show that the testimony had an independent source. Only a per
se exclusionary rule as to such testimony can be an effective sanction to
assure that law enforcement authorities will respect the accused's consti126. Under my concept of a Utopian world, the government's electronic recording (through
Colson) of Moulton's statements without a warrant would constitute a violation of the fourth
amendment. See Loewy, supra note 18, at 1252-54. Unfortunately, the law is otherwise. See
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). In any event, if the police had obtained a warrant
(which seems feasible in this case), the sixth amendment problems would remain.
127. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
128. Three years earlier, a dissenting opinion had criticized the Court for "(a]pplying the
new exclusionary rule" when the Court refused to admit a confession on sixth amendment
grounds. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 211 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
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tutional right to the presence of counsel at the critical lineup. In the
absence of legislative regulations adequate to avoid the hazards to a fair
trial which inhere in lineups as presently conducted, the desirability of
deterring the constitutionally objectionable practice must prevail over
the undesirability of excluding relevant evidence. 129

Despite this language, the Court, in the companion case of United
States v. Wade, 130 clearly and explicitly indicated that the purpose of
the counsel at the lineup was to insure a fair trial. 131 Consequently,
rather than lamenting the loss of relevant evidence, the Gilbert Court
should have applauded the exclusion of potentially prejudicial and
misleading evidence. More importantly, if the right to counsel exists
to insure a fair trial, consideration of the right should depend on the
state's introduction of illegal evidence. For example, a district attorney with six confirmed witnesses against the defendant might hold a
post-indictment lineup without counsel to see if a seventh witness
could also identify defendant. But if the district attorney did not use
the seventh witness, the defendant's right to a fair trial would not have
been violated, and the right to counsel never would have attached.
The concept of "deterring the constitutionally objectionable practice"
becomes meaningless since nothing unconstitutional occurs until illegal evidence is used.
But in his criticism of Gilbert, Professor Joseph Grano would have
expanded the ill-conceived exclusionary remedy rather than rights
analysis:
In the fourth amendment context, years of fervent debate preceded
the Court's conclusion that the exclusionary rule provides the most effective safeguard against police illegality. Yet, in establishing a right to
counsel at lineups, a right not presaged in a single jurisdiction, the court,
without the benefit of debate, apparently assumed that no other remedy
would suffice. The Court did not even specify the possible alternatives
being rejected as it had done in the search and seizure area. 132

One reason the Court did not specify alternatives was that a proce129. 388 U.S. at 272-73 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)).
130. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
131. The Wade Court wrote:
It is central to that (constitutional) principle that ... the accused is guaranteed that he need
not stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court
or out, where counsel's absence might derogate the accused's right to a fair trial. The security of that right is as much the aim of the right to counsel as it is of the other guarantees of
the Sixth Amendment - the right of the accused to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, and his right to
be confronted with the witnesses against him and to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor.
388 U.S. at 226-27 (footnotes omitted).
132. Grano, Kirby, Biggers, and Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against the
Danger of Convicting the Innocent?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 717, 791 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
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dural wrong can have only one remedy. Grano's suggestion of civil
suits or criminal prosecutions against police officers 133 would not wash
if there were no violation until the identification was introduced. Even
then, it would be the prosecutor and not the policeman who committed the wrong, and prosecutors have absolute immunity from suit. 134
Although the Court's "deterring the constitutionally objectionable
practice" 135 language provided the impetus for Grano's criticism, the
Court, unlike Grano, intuitively recognized that if counsel at a lineup
were necessary to preserve a fair trial, there could be no alternative to
exclusion. 136
Grano further argues that the Wade/Gilbert right is less basic to a
free society than freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Consequently, he contends that there is less reason to apply the exclusionary rule when the right to counsel is violated. 137 This analysis is
identical to and flawed in the same way as that which describes fourth
amendment rights as second class to the extent that their exclusionary
rule is not coterminous with coerced confessions. 138 With both fourth
and sixth amendment rights the issue is the nature of the right, not its
importance. While fourth amendment rights are basically substantive, 139 fifth and sixth amendment rights are procedural. Consequently, when the Court automatically excludes identifications
obtained in contravention of the Wade/Gilbert rule and simultaneously subjects fourth amendment violations to an exclusionary cost/
benefit analysis, it is not holding that Wade/Gilbert is more important,
only that it is different.
IV.

COERCED CONFESSIONS

In Malloy v. Hogan, the Supreme Court clearly held that coerced
confessions violate the privilege against self-incrimination. 140 Thus,
the use of such a confession constitutes the primary constitutional violation.141 Indeed, unlike a Miranda violation, which the Court views
133. Id. at 791 n.460.
134. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). But cf Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 811 n.16 (1982).
135. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273 (1967).
136. This is not to say that Gilbert necessarily is a good rule. One could certainly argue that
the right to counsel at a lineup is not necessary to insure a fair trial. If one accepts the Court's
premise about the necessity of counsel, however, the evidence must be excluded.
137. Grano, supra note 132, at 792-93.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
139. See supra Part I.
140. 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
.
141. Prior to Malloy, the purposes of excluding coerced confessions seemed to be (1) the
integrity of the fact-finding process, and (2) deterring unlawful police behavior. See generally
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as only conclusively presumed compulsion, 142 coerced confessions are
actually compelled within the meaning of the fifth amendment. Consequently, no derivative use, such as impeachment, is permissible. 143
Unlike confessions obtained from Miranda or sixth amendment violations, however, some coerced confessions are also obtained unconstitutionally. For an extreme example, consider Brown v.
Mississippi, 144 in which the defendants were severely beaten and were
threatened with continuous beatings unless they confessed. Such police conduct is clearly wrong in itself, regardless of whether any confession is used or even obtained. Consequently, defendants like
Brown, but unlike Miranda, can sue the police officers for violating
their constitutional rights. 145
Not all coerced confessions are unconstitutionally obtained, however. For example, assume that after remand in New York v.
Quarles, 146 the New York court were quite sensibly to hold that because Quarles was surrounded by four armed policemen who had just
handcuffed him, his confession was coerced. 147 Such a holding would
not be predicated on any constitutional impropriety by the police. Because Quarles had just committed rape while armed with a gun, the
police were certainly justified in threatening deadly force when arresting him and in handcuffing him upon arrest. 148 Nevertheless, constitutionally proper conduct did compel the defendant to make
incriminating statements. Consequently, the best solution is to disallow any civil suit by Quarles because the police did not violate his
rights in obtaining the evidence. At the same time, a court should
exclude the evidence because admitting it would violate Quarles' fifth
amendment rights.
Although ascertaining whether the confessions were unconstitutionally obtained was easy in Brown and Quarles, most cases fall between these extremes, and the determination is much more difficult.
Obtaining the coerced confession, without more, is not a violation.
Kamisar, What Is an Involuntary Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's Criminal
Interrogation and Confessions (Book Review), 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 728 (1963).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 91-111.
143. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
144. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
145. See United States ex rel Brzozowski v. Randall, 281 F. Supp. 306, 311-12 (E.D. Pa.
1968).
146. 467 U.S. 649 (1984); see supra text accompanying notes 87-96 (discussing New York v.
Quarles).
147. Whether such a ruling was ever made does not appear in the subsequent history of the
case.
148. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
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The violation occurs when some other right is violated in the process.
In Brown, for example, the police clearly imposed punishment without
due process of law, and cruel and unusual punishment at that. 149 For
this reason, I will designate cases like Brown as "coerced-confessionplus" cases.
An example of a close case is Haynes v. Washington, 150 a pre-Miranda case in which police held Haynes incommunicado until he
signed a written confession. Although Haynes had already orally confessed to the crime, 151 the police booked him for investigation, rather
than formally arresting him. In Spokane, Washington, at that time, a
person booked for investigation was not permitted to make phone calls
or have visitors. As a result, police were able to condition Haynes'
request to telephone his wife so that she could arrange for a lawyer on
his signing a written confession. Because Haynes was told that he
would be held incommunicado indefinitely until he signed the confession, the Court found his confession to be involuntary.
Although the Court described the police behavior as "official misconduct [that] cannot but breed disrespect for the law, as well as for
those charged with its enforcement," 152 it was not clear what the nature of the constitutional violation was. I suppose that at some point
incommunicado detention might constitute punishment without due
process of law, or even cruel and unusual punishment. 153 More likely,
the sixteen hours between booking and confession constituted an unreasonable seizure under the fourth amendment. One arrested without
a warrant is required to be taken to a magistrate without unnecessary
delay. 154 Given the willfulness of the delay, Haynes' fourth amendment rights were probably violated. 155 Under these circumstances
Haynes would qualify as a coerced-confession-plus case. He would be
entitled not only to have the written confession excluded, but to bring
a civil suit against the police.
149. See United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 101 (19Sl); cf. Screws v. United States, 32S
U.S. 91 (194S).
lSO. 373 U.S. S03 (1963).
lSl. His two prior oral confessions were introduced at trial, and not challenged on appeal.
373 U.S. at SOS.
1S2. 373 U.S. at S19.
1S3. Cf. Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1973) (inmates sentenced to indefinite
segregation without advance notice of charges against them were denied due process); Sostre v.
Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (inmate's sentence of indefinite solitary confinement for preparing a legal motion for codefendant was cruel and unusual punishment), modified
sub nom. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049, 40S U.S.
978 (1972).
1S4. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (197S).
lSS. Which, of course, may be an independent reason for excluding the confession. See
Thomas, The Poisoned Fruit of Pretrial Detention, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 413 (1986).
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Rogers v. RJchmond, 156 another pre-Miranda case, is a close case
that would probably be decided the other way. Rogers, who presumably had been lawfully arrested, 157 was transported without court order
from his jail to the prosecutor's office. There he was questioned by
several police officers for six hours, at which time one of the officers
threatened to bring Rogers' ill wife in for questioning if he did not
confess. Following another hour of silence from Rogers, the police
officer indicated that he was going to bring in Rogers' wife, and Rogers confessed. The next morning while Rogers was held incommunicado pursuant to a coroner's order, an attorney who came to see him
was denied access. Shortly thereafter, Rogers was transported to the
county courthouse where, pursuant to questions from the coroner, he
again confessed. The Supreme Court held the confessions to be inadmissible, emphasizing the procedural importance of not relying on
words coerced from defendant to convict. 158
Finding a basis for Rogers' claim against police for unconstitutionally obtaining the evidence is more difficult than it was in Haynes.
Transporting Rogers from jail to the prosecutor's office may have been
a violation of Connecticut law, but it would not seem to implicate the
fourth amendment. Similarly, denying counsel access to Rogers for
the relatively brief time that Rogers was held incommunicado would
not seem to be a violation of his right to counsel. 159 Even if Rogers'
right to counsel had attached, 160 the brief incommunicado period
would not likely give rise to a substantive law suit against the police as
opposed to an additional procedural reason for excluding the confession from evidence.
Rogers' other substantive claim would be based on the threat to
arrest his wife. Certainly, if she had been arrested without probable
cause, she would have a law suit against the police. Regardless of the
resolution of that issue, it is unlikely that Rogers could sue. He would
be claiming that the mere threat constituted a violation of his constitutional rights. What rights? Even if he could persuade a court that his
psychological well-being constituted life, liberty, or property, it is un156. 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
157. At least nothing to the contrary appears in the case.
158. "[O]urs is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system - a system in which the State
must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and may not by coercion prove
its charge against an accused out of his own mouth." 365 U.S. at 541.
159. Cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (falsely telling counsel that the suspect was
not being questioned neither violates suspect's constitutional rights, nor requires exclusion of the
subsequent confession).
160. This point had not been focused upon because the Court's jurisprudence had not yet
developed a special time at which the right to counsel attached.
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likely that a court would find the police conduct to have been so outrageous as to violate due process. 161 As a result, Rogers probably
represents a coerced confession case in which the confession was unconstitutionally used, but not unconstitutionally obtained.
In cases like Rogers, nobody other than the defendant should have
standing to challenge the confession. For example, if Rogers had implicated his brother and led the police to physical evidence implicating
both him and his brother, the evidence should be admissible against
his brother. In this regard, the situation is identical to confessions
obtained in violation of Miranda wamings. 162 Since the evidence
would have been constitutionally obtained, there is nothing improper
about using it against the brother. None of the brother's rights would
have been violated. The only possible constitutional wrong would be
the use of the evidence against Rogers.
In coerced-confession-plus cases, on the other hand, it is arguable
that third parties should have standing to challenge the confessions.
Because such confessions are unconstitutionally obtained, courts should minimize police incentive to obtain them. Excluding the evidence against third parties would certainly reduce police incentive to
act unconstitutionally. Unfortunately, to the extent that the plus in a
coerced-confession-plus case is a fourth amendment violation, as it
was in Haynes, the Court's fourth amendment exclusionary rule jurisprudence would probably deny third-party standing. 163
Suppose the case is more like Brown. For example, in People v.
Portelli, 164 the police, while investigating the murder of two of their
comrades, questioned Richard Melville, a man who they believed had
information implicating Portelli. Melville refused to incriminate
Portelli until the police subjected him to Brown-type torture, at which
point he admitted that Portelli had confessed to the entire crime. During Portelli's trial, Melville testified that what he had told the police
was true, but that he would not have provided the information had he
not been tortured. The New York Court of Appeals, while condemning the police behavior, allowed Melville's testimony and upheld
Portelli's conviction that rested upon it.
Assuming that the case were in the Supreme Court and that ~el161.
162.
163.
164.
(1966).

Cf. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
See supra text accompanying notes 56-86.
See supra text accompanying notes 26-29, 39-43.
15 N.Y.2d 235, 205 N.E.2d 857, 257 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1009
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ville's testimony could not be purged of the original taint, 165 should
the testimony be excluded? Unless the fourth amendment exclusionary rule cases could be distinguished, exclusion would seem inappropriate. Perhaps the Court could analogize this situation to the old
Wolf/Rochin rules. 166 Under these rules unconstitutionally obtained
evidence was admissible even against the victim of the search, but evidence obtained in a manner that "shocked the conscience" 167 was
inadmissible against the victim. The Court could retain this hierarchy
by holding that in most instances evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment is inadmissible against only the victim of the
search, but that evidence obtained in a manner that shocks the conscience is inadmissible against anybody.
This solution is not problem-free. One reason that the Wolf/
Rochin dichotomy was abandoned was the unmanageability of the
standard. 168 Furthermore, excluding some, but not other, unlawfully
obtained evidence at the behest of third parties really would create a
hierarchy of constitutional rights. 169 On the other hand, the right to
be free from police torture may in fact be more important than the
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Although I
would be the last to deprecate the importance of the fourth amendment, the right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures
simply is not as fundamental as the right to be free from torture. 110
Thus, despite the Court's unwillingness to recognize third-party standing to deter unconstitutional searches and seizures, it might allow such
165. Witness testimony is more easily purged of taint than other types of evidence. See
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978); cf. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
166. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
167. 342 U.S. at 172.
168. Concurring in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), which overruled Wolf, Justice Black
observed:
In concurring [in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954)), Mr. Justice Clark emphasized
the unsatisfactory nature of the Court's "shock-the-conscience test," saying that this "test"
"makes for such uncertainty and unpredictability that it would be impossible to foretell other than by guesswork - just how brazen the invasion of the intimate privacies of one's
home must be in order to shock itself into the protective arms of the Constitution." [347
U.S. at 138) •...
. . . Finally, today, we clear up that uncertainty. As I understand the Court's opinion in
this case, we again reject the confusing "shock-the-conscience" standard of the Wolf and
Rochin cases and, instead, set aside this state conviction in reliance upon the precise, intelligible and more predictable constitutional doctrine enunciated in [Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886)).
367 U.S. at 665-66.
169. Compare text accompanying notes 19-20 and notes 129-31.
170. I suppose that a rough analogy might be drawn between being a burglary victim and a
rape victim. One returning to a burglarized home surely must feel a sense of violation, but not at
the level felt by a rape victim.
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standing to deter the most flagrant forms of obtaining coerced
confessions.
CONCLUSION

Whether evidence is unconstitutionally obtained or unconstitutionally used makes a difference. If the only constitutional wrong inheres
in using the evidence, the Court has no business considering concepts
of deterrence. The Court should prohibit only use of such evidence.
Conversely, when obtaining evidence is the constitutional wrong, exclusion should be subjected to a cost/benefit analysis. If allowing
third-party standing would deter the objectionable practice, such
standing should be permitted. It is immaterial whether the third
party's rights were violated because redress of individual rights is not
the basis for exclusion.
One important problem which this article has identified is the
Court's frequently cavalier indifference to the nature of the problem
before it. Unless the Court is willing to focus on why it excludes evidence, it will continue to misanalyze problems involving police-obtained evidence. Perhaps of greatest importance, the Court ought to
understand what it is doing.

